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Mr. Lowe: I would like to correct two factual errors that I heard during
the presentations and then ask Dick Schmalensee a question. The first was,
as Michael Katz said, that the marginal cost to cardholders did change as a
result of the reduction in interchange fees. It was primarily because the
reward schemes were cut. In some cases, they were cut significantly.
The second point was that merchant discounts in fact did fall one for
one with the cut in the interchange fee. That fall took place within a
month of the change in the interchange fee. I don’t know whether that says
the merchant acquiring market is competitive but at least in this particular
instance, the fall was one for one.
My question to Dick was how he responds to two propositions. The first
one is about Alan Frankel’s point where, at least as I understood him, he
said that one of the fundamental problems here is that in these schemes,
the competitive pressure is to actually increase the interchange fee. You
write that by increasing the interchange fee you increase your sales, not by
reducing it. That means the pressure is on for these fees to go up and up
through time. That itself is prima facie evidence for a regulatory solution.
Also, I’d like to ask you how you would respond to the proposition that
this is prima facie evidence that there is a problem because the price that
cardholders face for using a credit card is much less than the price they face
for using a debit card. Yet, the relative costs go the other way around. So
the cheap payment instrument from a resource cost point of view is being
offered to cardholders at the relatively high price. Is that not prima facie
evidence that this is a problem?
Mr. Schmalensee:We did mention in the paper that reward schemes had
become less generous, but of course I don’t think all Australians have cards
with reward schemes. We don’t have numbers on the fraction of transac-
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 tions that go through those schemes. We also mentioned the impact of
changes in reward generosity . . . it’s a little like the old economic question
of the impact of changes in interest rates on savings. If you tell me I have
to spend $30,000 to take a trip instead of $20,000, it is not obvious that
reduces my incentive to spend. If I am saving for college and you cut the
interest rate, do I save more or less?
So the impact of changes in reward schemes is not actually quite as obvious
as it might be. We haven’t seen the data that say that merchant discounts have
fallen one for one. We’d love to see those data. We’ve looked hard to get data
on Australia, and they haven’t been as easy to find as we would have hoped.
So I’d love to see the data on that.
I think the assertion that competitive pressures lead to higher and high-
er interchange fees is, of course, an interesting one. We saw data earlier that
indicated that, in many countries where there is competition, interchange
fees are falling. It is not quite clear how you read that. It is certainly true
that competition among card schemes for issuers often takes the form of
rising interchange. It is also, of course, the case that competition among
card schemes for merchant allegiance takes the form of falling interchange.
It is a complicated business. We know historically across countries that we
simply have not seen a monotone increase in interchange fees, so that 
characterization is just too simple relative to the complexity we’ve seen.
Finally, on the differences in prices facing credit card holders and debit
card holders, there is no question that consumers do not face appropriate
price signals. I face a zero price for writing a check, even though it imposes
significant processing costs on the merchants. That doesn’t establish that
transactions are significantly misallocated. You really have to look across
transactions. There is no question that price signals are distorted.
Mr. Katz: Just one thing: your last point about checks emphasizes the
importance of looking country by country. Yes, if you do it at a broad 
theoretical level, who knows what is going to happen? For example, in
Australia, my understanding is that excess use of checks is not an issue at
merchants at all, because almost nobody uses them. While maybe it is a
theoretical possibility, it is not a practical one.
One other thing, as a matter of economic logic, Dick, if what you are saying
is right about the rewards program, there could be this backward-bending sup-
ply. By that argument, it very well could be that, if we made the interchange rate
go down, issuers would work harder to recoup the lost things and would pro-
mote Visa and MasterCard, where if it turns out we gave merchants less money,
they would do it.
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 Once you start getting to the point that it is theoretically possible, anything
can go in any direction. You also have no explanation of how it is that the
associations have set the interchange rate in the first place. And they have 
certainly said they have followed some rational process. At some point, if we
are going to get somewhere in this debate, we have to at least agree these are
the bounds of what we are going to consider theoretically.
I wrote a paper 20 years ago that said the only general theorem in industri-
al organization is that there is no other general theorem. But that does not get
us anywhere. We are going to try to figure out which things are probabilities.
Mr. Schmalensee: I would like to make one quick point to answer
Michael’s earlier point. In general, you would expect a variable fee to
change. That is true, except when there is a transaction cost to moving it
off zero, which there is in most non-reward systems. So for cards that did
not have rewards, there hasn’t been a change in the per-transaction fee. In
the case of reward cards, my understanding is that there generally has been
a change.
Mr. Katz: I agree with that. But I think it is also the case that most of the
concern—I am speaking for others here—has been precisely where there are
rewards programs, because it is the view that it is those people whose con-
sumption is being distorted, say, relative to the choice of debit. If I face a
price of zero for each, there still might be a distortion, because the Reserve
Bank believes debit is cheaper in resources. But it is much less of a distortion.
That, in fact, is exactly where they want to focus their efforts.
Mr. Schmalensee: I surely wish that data were available.
Mr. Rochet: I just wanted to respond to Philip Lowe. I am surprised that
the figures I gave about Australia are incorrect, because they were taken from
a speech by Governor Macfarlane. So I would like to see the other data that
you have.
Another statement in the same speech was interesting because Governor
Macfarlane was proud to observe that in Australia interchange fees were
about one-third of the level, on average, of the U.S. interchange fee. It seems
implicitly in his mind that it is a measure of social inefficiency—the lower
the interchange fee, the better is social welfare. This would imply that the
ultimate level is zero. I don’t think this is based on any economic reasoning.
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Mr. Brouwer: We should be very grateful to the Australian central bank
and Philip, because he is the only one who is providing some more data,
because they are already doing experiments.
Mr. Howell: For those of you who may not have heard of Coles Myer,
we have supermarkets, liquor stores, fuel, department stores, and discount
department stores. So we pretty much cover a fairly broad range of the
retail market in Australia.
I would just like to confirm with what Philip said about the reduction in
interchange fees passing through to a merchant service fee. I can certainly
speak on behalf of my organization, and we have 100 percent pass-
through. He’s absolutely right there, as far as I am aware.
I had a question in relation to the presentation by Jean-Charles Rochet.
Jean-Charles, when you spoke of mistake #2—and I am not sure whether
I am overanalyzing this or not—you had a zero cost for card payments for
merchants. I find that very curious, because that is quite different from our
experience where credit cards, excluding merchant fees, are still dearer than
cash to prices.
Mr. Rochet: This example was, of course, fictitious. What I meant was
that, first of all, the fees are not included, if you remember that. Second,
what matters is the qualitative cost with other means of payments. I have
the feeling that managing cash reserves is not a negligible item in mer-
chants’ accounts. If you can save on those managing costs, then it improves
or adds some benefit to the merchants.
Mr. Howell: Certainly, but in the case of credit cards, even if you
exclude the merchant fee, it costs more for a credit card to be processed
than a cash transaction.
Mr. Rochet: It was not meant to represent credit cards. It was just a
simple example.
Mr. Frankel: I also was looking at mistake #2 of your handout, Jean-
Charles. I think you’re looking at this very similarly to the way I was dis-
cussing earlier. If the externality is primarily focused at the merchant side,
if you assume acquirers are perfectly competitive, then it is all on the mer-
chant side. So then the question is: Wouldn’t you recommend letting the
merchant pick any interchange fee it wants and having that amount direct-
ly rebated back to the cardholder through the credit card system?Mr. Rochet: You are absolutely right, in a perfectly competitive system.
As soon as you introduce market power, then it is not true anymore. You
have to be very clear about where the market power is. Is it on the merchant
side? Is it on the acquirer side? Is it on the issuer side? The answer depends
a lot on the subtleties of market power. It is a very delicate matter.
Ms. Tumpel-Gugerell: I have a question about David Evans and
Richard’s data on the relative costs, net social costs of various payments
instruments. In Chart 1, you can see that, first of all, cash is underpriced,
but also that credit cards are far more expensive for the merchants com-
pared with debit cards. Would this be a case for promoting debit cards
from the merchant side more?
Mr. Evans: The point of that chart is that the black bar showed the net
social costs of each of these payments mechanisms. If you believe the num-
bers in this, cash has the highest net social cost after you include the rela-
tive cost and benefits to the cardholder side. So, if you believe these data,
cash is inferior for this example of a $54 transaction at a supermarket, and
credit and signature debit are both superior to that. That is the conclusion
you would reach, if you believed these data.
Now, as Dick pointed out, these are back-of-the-envelope calculations.
The question that is being asked here is the right question: What is the net
social cost of each of these payment mechanisms? We would certainly sug-
gest that it is nothing more than a back-of-the-envelope calculation. The
general point is that, if you want to know the right answer to the question
of whether particular kinds of payments systems are overused or under-
used, you need to ask the question: What is the net social cost of each one
of those?
Mr. Schmalensee: I also would point out that this is for a $54 transac-
tion at a grocery store. If you go back to the paper we cite, they find—as
do others—that the costs and benefits vary by transaction size, transaction
type, and so on. This is one kind of transaction; there are a lot of others.
Mr. Gabeiras: In 2001, the Spanish regulator allowed one of the 
networks in Spain to discriminate in setting interchange rates across the
merchant categories and delivered permission to use it for five years. This
permission has been cancelled recently—two weeks ago—without giving
any specific explanation. Is there any rationale, in terms of microeco-
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category codes in a similar way that the Ramsey prices are calculated in
terms of the elasticities of every demand curve? My perception is the
demand is homogenous throughout the various merchant categories.
Ms. Hatcher: I had another comment as well as a question on the net
social cost and this back-of-the-envelope calculation. The Food Marketing
Institute has done a number of studies that are not back-of-the-envelope,
that are payment cost studies. We have certainly calculated in the so-called
social cost in terms of the issues that were raised about theft and about pro-
cessing time on checks. We certainly wouldn’t want the 120-plus shoppers
in the room to think that merchants do no want customers to use cash; we
absolutely would prefer you to bring your cash and your checks in, because
we have been able to become efficient at processing that cash and process-
ing those checks and reducing a lot of the inefficiencies out of the system.
That is simply what we would like to be able to do on the electronic pay-
ment types as well.
Just in response to the question from Mr. Schmalensee asking if there is
something wrong. Our membership and a number of the retailers in the
room say that absolutely there is something wrong, whether it is the theo-
retical side or the actual side. The actual side is that on our profit margin,
we are paying twice as much in interchange fees as we receive on our net
profit on the same exact transaction.
Mr. Schmalensee: I’ll respond quickly. Yes, interchange fees in the
United States vary by merchant class to some extent. There is a rationale—
whether you would call it Ramsey pricing or price discrimination, those
being two sides of essentially the same coin—there is a profit-enhancing
rationale for tiering interchange fees. Whether allowing that gets you 
closer or farther away from a social optimum, I have no idea. I don’t think
anyone else does either.
Mr. Evans: Let me add one thing quickly on that point. If you look at
almost any product, there is extensive price discrimination in almost every
market. So the fact that interchange fees are tiered is certainly not surpris-
ing, relative to almost any other business.
Mr. Schmalensee: But the theoretical literature says the social welfare
effect is typically ambiguous. As to the cost studies, the Food Marketing
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 Institute has indeed done careful studies of grocery retailers’ costs. The
point of this exercise was to say that those studies don’t answer the ques-
tion of net social costs and benefits, including costs and benefits borne by
consumers. For there to be a misallocation, it is not enough for merchants
to prefer one type over another. It is a social question. Just like it is not suf-
ficient to answer Jean-Charles’ question about automobiles versus mass
transportation by saying, “No, no, no, consumers like to drive.”
Mr. McAndrews: I wanted to ask two questions, one for Jean-Charles.
He points out that the interchange fee and surcharges are antagonistic
instruments. This was also pointed out by Steve Salop in a paper of his sev-
eral years ago. If the issuer can charge a price or subsidize a cardholder and
the merchant can charge a price or subsidize the card user, then the inter-
change fee becomes irrelevant. Jean-Charles said it doesn’t make any sense
to have both interchange fees and surcharging. Of course, some of us in the
room would recognize this as a situation in the U.S. ATM industry. Jean-
Charles, would you agree with Salop that, if you allow surcharging—and
in ATMs in the United States, surcharging is quite feasible technologically
and, of course, banks can charge their cardholders easily—would you 
recommend an elimination of the interchange fee? Unlike Salop’s predic-
tion that the interchange fee would wither away once surcharging became
widespread, it still remains.
Then I have a question also for David and Richard. I take issue with your
historical examination of the U.S. check industry. Being from the Federal
Reserve, I have to, of course, defend my institution. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, the clearinghouses set exchange fees at zero, so zero was an important
number. I also think zero is an important number. It is very different from
an interchange fee. In a one-sided market, zero is the interchange fee.
I ask the question to you, are checks a two-sided market? Rochet and
Tirole point out very clearly that for a two-sided market to exist, there must
be a failure of Coasian bargaining between the buyer and the seller. Jean-
Charles pointed out in his paper that cardholders typically make the choice
of the payment at the point of sale. Checks in the United States today aver-
age about $1,000. The buyer and the seller can negotiate any externalities in
their use of checks. Checks often occur in recurring relationships and so on.
So I would think the burden of proof is on you for suggesting that checks
are a two-sided instrument and saying that all payments systems are two-
sided markets. I don’t believe that is clear, especially for the larger-value pay-
ments systems.
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the check business in the nineteenth century suggests it was much more a
case of a holdup problem. What was going on was very similar to what you,
Mr. Schmalensee, were talking about on bilateral bargaining. You had these
banks that were not even bilaterally, but simply unilaterally, attempting to
get the benefits of a better technology for delivering checks from one place
to another—that is, the mail system. I think that the Federal Reserve’s
action in establishing par checking was not a case either of setting an inter-
change fee at zero, but it was assisting the solution of a multilateral holdup
problem, when there was no multilateral way for the parties to transact.
Mr. Constantine: Dick, I would like to ask you a question and just make
an observation that virtually every economist has bemoaned the lack of
data. But there are a lot of facts out there, so I’d like you to react to some
facts. This is on your point that you don’t have to take into consideration
only benefits to merchants or costs to merchants, but also benefits and
costs to consumers or cardholders.
With PIN and signature debit, a fairly objective comparison is that PIN
debit is two to three times faster at the point of sale, meaning the transac-
tion takes half the time or a third the time. A signature debit transaction is
seven to 10 times more likely to be fraudulent. The money in the transac-
tion moves two to three times faster. You might say for a cardholder that
means they lose a little float, but that also correlates to a much higher rate
of bounced checks when you use signature debit versus PIN debit.
I would somehow like to fit the interchange philosophy that your client
Visa utilized over the years, whereby the interchange on PIN debit was a
tiny fraction of the interchange charge for signature debit, into your and
David’s methodological framework.
Mr. Evans: I guess maybe I didn’t understand the first portion of the last
part of your observation.
In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a lot of checks
were transferred not at par by the clearinghouses. I am certainly not an expert
in the checking business, but my understanding is that the Federal Reserve,
in effect, forced on-par exchange, because there were indeed interchange fees
that were positive between banks. So that was the regulatory intervention.
I do think of the checking industry as a two-sided market. You have an
acquirer and an issuer of checks, just as you do in the credit card situation.
There is an issue of what the optimal price is. You can make an argument,
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 which we could debate, as to whether zero is the right price for that trans-
fer between the bank that issued the check and the bank that is processing
the check. But, again, that is an empirical issue.
The one other general observation I would like to make on a lot of these
points is, to a large extent, many of the observations we get into in this
debate really are in the weeds, in the sense that the fundamental question
really is an empirical question. It is the question that we discussed with
regard to the Food Marketing Institute and the social benefits and social
costs to different payments mechanisms.
Ultimately, the empirical question is: Is there evidence that there is
overuse or underuse of cards, whether it is credit cards or debit cards or
cash or checks?
If we are talking about things from a regulatory intervention standpoint,
that is the relative empirical piece of information we need to have. That is
the kind of empirical inquiry we need that can help resolve some of these
issues. Some of these details—in which I would include some of Lloyd’s
observations—really are in the weeds. We need to understand the relative
social costs and benefits of alternative payments systems before we start
talking about regulatory interventions or, for that matter, saying that every-
thing is just grand.
Mr. Schmalensee: I’ll respond briefly. First, I am not going to defend
Visa’s interchange philosophy. I don’t know what it has been. We can see
the rates. I assume Lloyd is talking primarily about the American honor-
all-cards rule that linked signature debit and credit, and that was thrown
out by the courts.
We actually discuss the relation between signature debit and PIN-based
debit in our book, and I will make a modest plug for it: Paying with Plastic,
second edition, MIT Press, 2005, a terrific read.
The history is fascinating. The systems couldn’t get banks to issue signa-
ture debit, so they needed a high interchange fee to get issuing done. The
systems couldn’t get merchants to install PIN pads to get PIN debit used
for merchant transactions, so they needed a very low interchange to pene-
trate on the merchant side. We are now seeing this very interesting pattern
of readjustment after they have been decoupled. The plaintiffs in the case
that broke the U.S.-style honor-all-cards rule argued for damage purposes
that what was going to happen was that the signature debit interchange fee
would fall rapidly to the level of the PIN debit fee. Well, it didn’t happen.
That market is much more complicated, and this is not the place to try to
understand it in all its dynamic detail.
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we mentioned, and that is this business about the choice between driving
your own car and taking public transportation. If the price of automobiles
reflects the social cost and the price of public transportation reflects the
social cost, then you don’t need to know what consumers’ benefits are in
terms of driving or taking the subway. Because if they face those costs, they
will make the right decision and you can decentralize. That is the whole
point of the market economy.
It is important to recognize that it is absolutely right that efficiency
depends on costs and benefits. We also have to remember we are using
market forces to some degree, even under regulation. We need to take that
into account because then we can economize on some of the information
we have to collect. As Jean-Charles would say, you have to make sure you
get the social costs right.
The second thing is on interchange and surcharge. I’ll say two things
about them. There is a tension between the two. We need to remember a
couple things. One, there is heterogeneity of merchants. So when you talk
about the interchange or the surcharge, it could vary across the two. You
may well want to have both at once, because only some merchants sur-
charge. I won’t go into detail here. It is not a coincidence you see the mer-
chants surcharging, for example, in Australia. It is not just a random selec-
tion of merchants; it is particular types. It suggests that it may be useful to
have both at once.
The other thing that is important—and I’ll have to say this as an econo-
mist—is you’ll have to remember equilibrium analysis. The possibility of
surcharging may be enough to have an effect, so that in equilibrium you
don’t see any. There is some evidence—maybe weak—to believe that in
Australia, the possibility of surcharging itself has some effect on the three-
party schemes and how they price.
It is wrong to measure the effectiveness of a policy by how much . . . it
is like saying the way you should figure out whether the policy of having
speeding tickets works is to see how many people pay speeding tickets.
Well, that is the wrong way. It is obvious you want to look at what the
effects are on how fast people drive. We need to be a little careful of how
we judge surcharging.
Mr. Rochet: I fully agree. In particular, it shows that the interchange fees
in an ideal world should be differentiated across merchants, so it is quite
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 possible that for some merchants for which the benefits are smaller than
the costs, the interchange fees then should be negative. That is perfectly
possible. The possibility of surcharging—and I agree with Mike Katz—can
add to the competitiveness of the systems, can force the networks to put
their interchange fee decision more in line with social efficiency. But I was
just remarking that in a given market, if you have simultaneously a posi-
tive interchange fee and a positive surcharge, it doesn’t make any sense.
That’s all I was saying.
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